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In the mid-twentieth century, George Orwell and Michel Foucault penned vastly influential 
visions of surveillance and its role in disciplining subjects. Their ideas still, quite often, 
frame discussions of surveillance after the Snowden revelations of 2013. Yet in many ways, 
these twentieth-century narratives are ill-equipped to describe recent developments: the 
increasing role of corporate and financial players in online surveillance; the move from 
discipline toward behavioural modulation; the increasingly predictive, speculative 
orientation of online surveillance apparatuses; and the prevalence of automated, algorithmic 
user identification. Not only governmental bodies, such as NSA and GCHQ, watch; hosts 
of corporate and financial players monetize data, identify users, and predict future 
behaviour. Automated, algorithmic witnesses attempt to determine who we are, and 
predetermine what we see online. What are the implications of these automated witnesses 
for artists? What are the implications of claims – made by Trevor Paglen and others – that, 
in order to respond to these new conditions of control, artists may need to learn to see the 
way their automated witnesses see?  
In her ground-breaking Islamic genealogy of new media art (2010), Laura Marks writes of 
Islamic carpet designs as algorithmic interplays of inputs and outputs, which enable a kind 
of inorganic thought to play itself out in, and as, design. Algorithms constantly perform 
such forms of inorganic thought in the server farms that constitute the computational 
backdrops of daily life; but in a surveillance economy, they have largely been tasked with 
acts of identification and witnessing, which at least partly reinforce reified racial, class and 
gender biases. In light of the ubiquity of automated witnesses, Trevor Paglen calls for 
artists to drop visual culture – so irrelevant to machinic seeing – as a frame of reference. 
Yet his own works certainly do not achieve this; if anything, they uphold end extend both 
the visual tropes of romanticism, and the psychoanalytic discourses of the scopic drive. 
Further, it could be argued that Paglen’s approach reflects a privileged de-privileging of the 
humanist frameworks of visual culture, insofar as it fails to sufficiently differentiate 
between its humanist investments and its posthumanist aims. In constrast, feminist works 
by Erica Scourti and others self-consciously stage a dialogue between human subjects and 
their algorithmic witnesses, thereby opening a space for navigating the differences between 
human perception and machine identification, and exploring the myriad ways in which 
algorithmic witnesses subtly reshape the tropes of visual culture.  
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